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Family Law.  Giarrusso v. Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102 (R.I. 2019). 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s 
decision and order enforcing a property settlement agreement that 
the parties had agreed to as a part of their dissolution of marriage.1 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
 Plaintiff Diane Giarrusso (Diane)2 and Defendant Paul 
Giarrusso (Paul) divorced after twenty-three years of marriage.3  
During their marriage, the parties acquired two dogs: a greyhound 
named Marox and a Chihuahua named Winnie.4  In October 2016, 
the parties “entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA), 
formalizing the terms of dissolution of their marriage.”5  The MSA 
awarded Diane “all right title and interest in and to” the two dogs, 
but Paul was “permitted to take the dogs for visits from Tuesday 
morning at 8 a.m. through Thursday morning at 8:00 a.m.”6 
 From October 2016 until the end of March 2017, Diane abided 
by the MSA, allowing Paul’s weekly visitation with the dogs.7  By 
the end of March 2017, however, “Diane unilaterally ceased 
allowing the weekly visits.”8  In May 2017, Paul filed a motion for 
post-final judgment relief with the Providence County Family 
Court.”9  In his motion, Paul claimed that “Diane had denied his 
visitation time with the dogs for several weeks.”10  Paul asked the 
1. Giarrusso v. Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102 (R.I. 2019).
2. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, Diane Giarrusso and Paul
Giarrusso are referred to by their first names. 
3. Id. at 1104.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.  In January 2017, the Providence County Family Court entered a
final judgment officially dissolving the marriage. Id. The judgment 
“incorporated the MSA without merging it.”  Id. 
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Family Court to “enforce the MSA by ordering Diane to comply with 
the visitation schedule, provide makeup visits for the weeks denied 
to him, and award his attorney’s fees for his pursuit of the court-
enforcement order.”11  Diane opposed the motion and filed her own 
motion for relief in July of 2017.12  Diane looked “to enjoin and 
restrain Paul from having any time with the dogs[,]” claiming that 
“Paul had not properly cared for the dogs when they were with him 
and had attempted to keep the dogs away from her, thereby 
breaching the MSA.”13 
 On December 4, 2017, a Family Court justice held a hearing 
on the matter where both parties testified.14  The hearing justice 
also reviewed text messages and emails exchanged between the 
parties, as well as veterinary bills and records.15  In her testimony, 
Diane gave examples of Paul’s alleged mistreatment of the dogs.16  
Diane attested that “Marox returned from one visit with one of his 
claws damaged, hanging and bleeding,” and that “Marox returned 
from another visit with a ‘huge bubble on his lip.’”17  After both 
instances, Diane “took Marox to the vet.”18  Paul, however, refuted 
Diane’s allegations, arguing that “he heard about the damaged claw 
for the first time while in court and that the bubble on Marox’s lip 
had appeared while he was away for a two-week work-related 
trip.”19  Additionally, Paul pointed out that “the MSA gave Diane 
complete control over the care of the dogs, such that he could not 
take them to the vet or make any decisions about their care.”20 
 Paul’s last visitation with the dogs occurred on March 29, 
2017.21  That afternoon, Paul called Diane to tell her that “the dogs 
were acting strangely and [that] Winnie was whimpering.”22  When 
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1104–05.
16. Id. at 1105.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.  Through text messages, the parties “argued . . . whether Diane
would pick up only Winnie to take him to the vet or whether she would pick up 
both dogs because, according to Diane, the dogs became anxious when they 
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Diane arrived at Paul’s residence, however, she received the 
unfortunate news that Marox was nowhere to be found.23  Paul 
testified that after his telephone conversation with Diane, “he had 
let the dogs out to relieve themselves and he thought both dogs had 
returned inside the house, but then he could not find Marox.”24  
Friends, family, and neighbors of the parties joined them in the 
search for the greyhound.25  After an hour and a half search, “Paul 
found Marox, who had apparently been in his house the entire time, 
stuck in a closet.”26  Paul attested that he was distressed over 
Marox’s disappearance and assured that the incident was not a 
malicious attempt to upset Diane.27  
Following the incident on March 29, Paul attempted to visit the 
dogs but stated that “Diane had not responded to his 
communications.”28  In her own motion for relief, Diane asked the 
hearing justice to “withdraw the court’s approval of the MSA 
because, in light of the incidents described during the testimony, 
the MSA provision allowing Paul weekly visitations was 
inequitable.”29  In response, Paul argued that “Diane had breached 
the terms of the MSA, which she had effectively admitted when she 
stated that she had not allowed him to see the dogs since March 
29.”30 
 After hearing both parties’ arguments, the hearing justice held 
in favor of Paul.31  The hearing justice found that the MSA 
“unambiguously gave Paul the right to visitation with the dogs 
every week from Tuesday to Thursday and did not provide for 
splitting the costs of the care and maintenance of the dogs.”32  The 
were separated.”  Id.  The parties “eventually agreed that Diane would pick up 
both dogs so she could take Winnie to the vet.”  Id. 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.  “Diane testified that she ‘was so upset and hysterical’ during the
search effort that she ‘was puking on the side of the road.’”  Id.  Similarly, Paul 
testified that he was emotional and crying “both before Diane arrived and 
throughout the search for Marox.”  Id. 
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1106.  The Court noted that, “[d]uring his testimony, Paul’s
distress about the litigation over the dogs was palpable.”  Id. 
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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hearing justice also noted how “Paul always acted in good faith with 
respect to the dogs.”33  Accordingly, the hearing justice ordered that 
Paul “ha[ve] the dogs Tuesdays through Thursdays as provided in 
[the MSA]” and awarded attorney’s fees to Paul in the amount of 
$5,248.70.34  Further, “[t]he hearing justice denied Diane’s request 
relief.”35  Diane timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court).36 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
 The Court sought to determine two issues: (1) whether the 
hearing justice erred by not reforming the MSA and (2) whether the 
hearing justice erred in finding that “there was no inequity in 
enforcing [the terms of] the MSA as written.”37  The Court limned 
the standard of review, stating that it “will not disturb findings of 
fact made by a trial justice or magistrate in a divorce action unless 
he or she has misconceived the relevant evidence or was otherwise 
clearly wrong.”38 
The Court first rejected Diane’s argument that “the hearing 
justice erred by not reforming the MSA.”39  The Court pointed out 
that a property settlement agreement is a contract for all legal 
purposes.40  Accordingly, the Court reiterated that before a contract 
is subjected to judicial reformation, the court must first find a 
mutual mistake between the parties.41  The court defined a mutual 
mistake as “one that is common to both parties wherein each labors 
under a misconception respecting the same terms of the written 
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Bober v. Bober, 92 A.3d 152, 157 (R.I. 2014)).
39. Id. at 1107.
40. Id.  “It is well settled that a property settlement agreement that has
been ‘incorporated by reference, but not merged into the final divorce decree, 
retains the characteristics of a contract.’”  Id. (quoting Esposito v. Esposito, 38 
A.3d 1, 5 (R.I. 2012)).  “Consequently, unless it is shown that the trial justice
either improperly exercised his or her discretion or that there was an abuse
thereof, [the] Court [said it] will not disturb the trial justice’s findings.” Id. at
1106 (quoting Palin v. Palin, 41 A.3d 248, 253 (R.I. 2012)).
41. Id. at 1107 (citing Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
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agreement sought to be reformed,”42  and explained that “[w]hen a 
mutual mistake is manifest in the agreement at the time it is 
entered into, the agreement fails in a material respect correctly to 
reflect the understanding of both parties.”43 
 Here, the Court first recognized that the MSA is a contract and 
that dogs are personal property.44  The Court noted that the 
hearing justice “explicitly found that Diane understood the contract 
and concluded there was no mistake in the contract.”45  As the 
Court explained, “[b]oth parties testified that, at the time they 
entered into the MSA, they intended for Diane to have all rights to 
the dogs, with weekly visitation for Paul.”46  Accordingly, the Court 
held that there was “no mutual mistake in the MSA’s visitation 
term and no indication that the hearing justice misconceived the 
evidence when she concluded that the MSA need not be 
reformed.”47 
 The Court then addressed Diane’s argument that the MSA 
was “inequitable” and that Paul “acted in bad faith.”48  The Court 
acknowledged “the Family Court’s important role in monitoring 
property settlement agreements between spouses and ensuring an 
equitable division of assets.”49  The Court explained that while the 
Family Court does have the authority to review and reform a 
property settlement agreement if it determines that the agreement 
is inequitable, “[i]t is not the function of [the Supreme] Court, or 
the Family Court, to set aside a property settlement agreement 
simply because a party no longer wishes to be bound by its terms or 
is unhappy with the result.”50  Consequently, the Court affirmed 
the Family Court justice’s decision and order.51  The Court held 
42. Id. (quoting Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
43. Id. (quoting Esposito, 38 A.3d at 5).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Bober v. Bober, 92 A.3d 152, 157 (R.I. 2014) and Gorman v.
Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 740-41 (R.I. 2005)). 
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Gorman, 883 A.2d at 737).
50. Id. at 1108 (quoting O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 79 A.3d 815, 822 (R.I.
2013)) (internal quotations omitted). 
51. Id.  “After reviewing the entire record in this case, [the Court found]
that the hearing justice’s findings and conclusions were well supported by the 
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that “it is not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA 
as written.”52  The Court ordered Diane to comply with the MSA 
and to pay $5248.70 in attorney’s fees.53 
COMMENTARY 
 The Court found that the hearing justice did not err in (1) not 
reforming the MSA and (2) not finding that the MSA was 
inequitable.54  In doing so, the Court emphasized how it is neither 
the Court’s nor the Family Court’s function to tear up or reform a 
contract simply because one of the parties is no longer content with 
it.55  Here, the Court is directly referring to Diane, who breached 
the contract by not permitting Paul to see the dogs after March 
29.56  As a result of this breach, Diane must not only comply with 
the MSA, but must also pay attorney’s fees in the amount of 
$5248.70.57   
While the Court made it clear that Diane would not have been 
able to get a judicial remedy for what she sought—retaining full 
ownership of the dogs without any visitation arrangement—the 
Court did indicate that it nevertheless might have reviewed her 
objection to paying Paul’s attorney fees.58  The Court concluded, 
however, that any such argument was waived.59  Even though 
Diane “briefly mention[ed] that the hearing justice erred by 
awarding attorney’s fees to Paul” during her pre-briefing 
statement, Diane’s argument was waived because she failed to 
preserve the issue when “she did not object to the court’s order 
memorializing both the award and her consent thereto.”60  Even if 
Diane had objected to the court’s order of the award, however, 
Diane nonetheless waived appellate review of the attorney’s fee 
because she did not meaningfully discuss this argument, but rather 
testimony and evidence before her and that she neither misconceived the 
evidence nor was clearly wrong in her findings of fact.” Id. 
52. Id.
53. See id. at 1106.
54. Id. at 1007–08.
55. Id. at 1008.
56. Id. at 1106.
57. See id. at 1007–08.
58. See id. at 1107 n.8.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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simply mentioned the issue in her pre-briefing statement.61  Thus, 
while the Court made it clear that Diane would not be able to have 
exclusive rights to the dogs, the Court would have reviewed her 
objection to paying Paul’s attorney fees if she had preserved the 
issue below and argued the issue on appeal.62 
CONCLUSION 
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing justice 
did not err when she did not reform the MSA and when she did not 
find the MSA inequitable.63  Pursuant to contract law, the Court 
found that the Family Court did not err in enforcing the property 
settlement agreement the parties had agreed upon as a part of their 
dissolution of marriage.64 
Karen Lara 
61. Id.  (citing Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1102.
64. Id.
